It is well documented that individuals make different choices in the context of group decisions, such as elections, from choices made in isolation. In particular, individuals tend to conform to the decisions of others -a property we call the consensus effect -which in turn implies phenomena such as group polarization and the bandwagon effect. We show that the consensus effect is equivalent to a well-known violation of expected utility, namely strict quasi-convexity of preferences. Our results qualify and extend those of Eliaz, Ray and Razin (2006) , who focus on choice-shifts in group when one option is safe (i.e., a degenerate lottery). In contrast to the equilibrium outcome when individuals are expected utility maximizers, the consensus effect implies that group decisions may fail to properly aggregate preferences in strategic contexts and strictly Pareto-dominated equilibria may arise. Moreover, these problems become more severe as the size of the group grows.
Introduction
Group decision-making is ubiquitous in social, economic, and political life. Individuals often tend to make different choices depending on whether the outcome of interest is a result of their choice alone or also the choice of others in a group. These choice shifts in groups have been demonstrated in a variety of contexts across fields, with abundant evidence supporting the idea that they are largely predicted by the preference of the majority of individuals. For example, political scientists often discuss the bandwagon effect, where voters are more likely to vote for candidates who they think will win, i.e., who they believe others will vote for. 1 Another example, from the psychology and sociology literature, is the robust finding that individuals, when voting in a group, will take riskier or safer decisions vis-à-vis those taken by the individuals separately.
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In the legal realm, jurors and judges tend to be affected by the preferences of other members of the jury or the court. 3 As an influential early article in sociology by Granovetter (1978) summarized it, "collective outcomes can seem paradoxical -that is intuitively inconsistent with the intentions of the individuals who generate them." Models of group decisions have tended to focus on either private-value or commonvalue settings. Because, with expected utility preferences, and a private-values settings, we should not observe choice shifts, much of the literature exploring choice shifts has focused on the common-values setting. In this context, group decisions aggregate private information regarding the relative value of possible outcomes. 4 In contrast, in this paper we maintain a private-value setting, but relax the assumption of expected utility. To see why a violation of expected utility may generate choice shifts in groups, note that in group decisions, any individual choice matters only when that individual is pivotal, that is, when his vote actually changes the outcome. However, from an ex-ante perspective, when choosing for which option to vote, an individual does not know whether or not he will be pivotal. Thus, his choice is not a choice between receiving Option 1 or Option 2 for sure, but rather between lotteries defined over these two options. Violations of the independence axiom of expected utility imply that an individual may prefer Option 1 to Option 2 in isolation, yet prefer the lottery induced in the group context by choosing Option 2 over the one induced by choosing Option 1, thus accounting for the aforementioned choice shift. In Section 2 we formally link violations of expected utility with the phenomenon of choice shifts in groups. In doing so, we provide a relationship between two types of non-standard behavior, one observed at the individual level and one at the group level. Our first result states that if (and only if) individuals have preferences that are strictly quasi-convex in probabilities, then they will systematically exhibit a consensus effect -an individual who is indifferent between two options when choosing in isolation will actually strictly prefer the option that is sufficiently likely to be chosen by the group. In other words, the consensus effect captures the stylized fact that in group contexts individuals want to exhibit preferences that match those of the group as a whole. Quasi-convexity, on the other hand, is a well established preference pattern in decision making under risk, according to which individuals are averse toward randomization between equally good lotteries.
5 Popular models of preferences over lotteries which can exhibit quasi-convexity include rank-dependent utility (RDU), quadratic utility, and Kőszegi and Rabin's (2007) model of reference-dependence. Our result thus links notions of reference dependence in individual choice with similar notions (the consensus effect) in group choice. In a seminal paper discussing choice shifts in groups, Eliaz, Ray, and Razin (2006, hereafter ERR) used the same model of group decision-making but focused on group choices between particular pairs of options, safe and risky, where the former is a lottery that gives a certain outcome with probability one. They confined their attention to RDU preferences and established an equivalence between specific types of choice shifts and Allais-type behavior, one of the most documented violation of expected utility at the individual level. Since choice shifts in groups are observed in experiments even when all lotteries involved are non-degenerate, our results suggest that the choice shifts discussed in ERR are actually manifestations of the consensus effect. In Section 3 we turn to relating our results to those in ERR. We extend their results for RDU preferences, but also demonstrate why the relation to Allais paradox is restricted to that specific class of preferences. In particular, the consensus effect is in general consistent not only with Allais-type behavior, but also with the opposite pattern of choice.
In Section 4 we analyze what type of observable equilibrium behavior results from quasi-convex preferences in conjunction with strategic considerations. We describe a majority voting game as a collection of individuals, each of whom receiving one vote to cast in favor of option p or option q (no abstentions are allowed). Following the conventions of much of the recent literature (e.g. Morgan, 2012 and Pesendorfer, 1999) , we use the Poisson model introduced by Myerson (1998 Myerson ( , 2000 , according to which the number of voters is a random variable drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean N . Individuals' preferences (types) are drawn from a known distribution of preferences. After observing their own preferences, but no other information, individuals vote. Whichever option receives the majority of the votes is implemented. (If the vote is tied, then the winner is decided by coin flip.)
As previously mentioned, expected utility maximizers do not alter their choice in the context of group choice. In contrast, the fact that individuals with quasiconvex preferences do not like to randomize implies that voting games take on the properties of a coordination game. These individuals benefit from coordinating their votes with others because it reduces the amount of "randomness" in the election. They typically face a tradeoff between having the option they prefer selected and reducing the uncertainty regarding the identity of the chosen outcome.
We prove the existence of equilibria and describe their main properties. We also examine how the set of equilibria depends on the distribution of types, the voting rule, and the size of the electorate. For example, in contrast to the results under expected utility, when individuals exhibit the consensus effect, group decisions may fail to aggregate preferences properly and strictly Pareto-dominated equilibria may result. Moreover, these problems become more severe as the size of the group grows.
In Section 5 we relate our results to commonly discussed phenomena such as group polarization and the bandwagon effect, and provides foundations for the previously discussed empirical findings. We also discuss how our findings compare to the findings in the larger literature on voting, including both common and private value settings.
The Consensus Effect and Quasi-Convex Preferences
Our aim is to link an individual's private ranking of objects with his ranking of these same objects in a group context. We assume that any individual has preferences over monetary lotteries. Formally, let X ⊂ R be an interval of monetary prizes, and denote by ∆ the set of lotteries with finite support over X. We identify an individual with his complete, transitive, and continuous preference relation over ∆, which is also monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Throughout the paper we denote by x, y, z generic elements of X and by p, q, r generic elements of ∆.
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In describing group decision problems, we extend the model suggested by ERR (see Section 3). Let I be a group of individuals. We identify a group decision problem as perceived by an individual i ∈ I with a quadruple (p, q, α, β), consisting of two lotteries p, q ∈ ∆ and two scalars α, β ∈ (0, 1); α is the probability that individual i's decision is pivotal in choosing between p and q, and β is the probability that the group chooses p conditional on i not being pivotal.
7 (For now, α and β are exogenous and fixed. In Section 4 they will be derived as part of the equilibrium analysis.) If, in the group context, the individual votes for q, the effective lottery he faces is
And if the individual votes for p, the effective lottery he faces is
A choice shift is thus the joint statement of p ∼ q but q * p * or q * ≺ p * . An individual decision problem can be thought of as the situation where α ≡ 1. Our definition of the consensus effect below suggests a specific type of choice shift, whereby an individual tends to draw towards what others would do in the absence of him being pivotal. In particular, it captures the idea that if other members of the group are likely enough to choose p when the individual is not pivotal, then the individual himself will prefer to choose p as well.
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Definition 1. The individual exhibits a consensus effect at (p, q, α, β * ) if p ∼ q and β > β * (resp. β < β * ) implies that q * p * (resp., q * ≺ p * ). The individual exhibits the consensus effect if for all p, q, α with p ∼ q, there exists a β * such that he exhibits the consensus effect in (p, q, α, β * ).
Anti-consensus effect at (p, q, α, β * ) and general anti-consensus are similarly defined.
Observe that if a decision-makers preferences satisfies the following betweenness property, p ∼ q implies γp + (1 − γ)q ∼ q, 9 then it will never display any choice shift in group. Such a property is a directly implication of Independence, although it does not imply Independence. This suggests that to accommodate such shifts, one needs to go beyond expected utility (or, more generally, beyond the betweenness class of preferences, suggested by Chew, 1983 and Dekel, 1986 ). Thus, we consider the following two properties.
Definition 2. The preference relation is strictly quasi-convex if for all p, q ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [0, 1],
and is strictly quasi-concave if
Quasi-convexity implies aversion towards randomization between equally good prospects; whereas quasi-concavity implies affinity to such randomization. Betweenness preferences are those that satisfy both weak quasi-convexity and weak quasiconcavity.
Our first result links violations of expected utility in the individual level with a specific pattern of choices in group situations. Proposition 1. Preferences are strictly quasi-convex (resp., strictly quasi-concave) if and only if they exhibit the consensus (resp., anti-consensus) effect. 8 The consensus effect is defined where p ∼ q. By continuity, the choice patterns that we study when the options are indifferent will persist even when one option is strictly preferred to the other. 9 For any lotteries p,q ∈ ∆, αp + (1 − α)q is the lottery that yields x with probability αp(x) + (1 − α)q(x).
We now discuss the implications of Proposition 1 for some popular non-expected utility models. (We focus throughout the paper on the quasi-convex case, although the results naturally extend, modulo standard reversal, to the quasi-concave case.)
Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU): Order the prizes x 1 < x 2 < ... < x n . The functional form for RDU is:
where the weighting function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is bijective and strictly increasing. If g (l) = l then RDU reduces to expected utility. RDU preferences are quasi-convex if and only if the weighting function is convex (see Wakker, 1994) . Convexity of the weighting function is typically described as a type of pessimism: improving the ranking position of an outcome decreases its decision weight. This suggests the following corollary. That is, individuals who tend to overweight bad outcomes will also exhibit the consensus effect -they will display a preference for conformity.
The consensus effect, as previously discussed, is weak, in the sense that it does not determine how likely it has to be that the group chooses p in the absence of the individual being pivotal. However, if we put more structure on preferences we can have stronger results. This motivates introducing the class of quadratic preferences.
Quadratic Utility: A utility functional is quadratic in probabilities if it can be expressed in the form
where φ : X × X → R is symmetric. 10 The quadratic functional form was introduced in Machina (1982) and further developed in Chew, Epstein, Segal (1991 Segal ( , 1994 .
The following result establishes that in the class of quadratic preferences, the consensus effect becomes a majority effect -β * always equals .5, independently of 10 There is no loss of generality in restricting φ to be symmetric, since an arbitrary φ(x, y) can always be replaced in the quadratic formula by
the two options under consideration. So, when pivotal, the individual simply chooses the option he believes the group is most likely to choose when he is not pivotal.
Proposition 2. Suppose preferences can be represented by a quadratic functional.
Then preferences are strictly quasi-convex if and only if the individual exhibits the consensus effect at (p, q, α, .5).
The following class of preferences was introduced by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) and Delquié and Cillo (2006) .
Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibrium: The value of a lottery p is
gain-loss utility where u is an increasing utility function over final wealth and
is a gain-loss function with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2 denoting the coefficient of loss aversion. Loss aversion occurs when λ ≥ 1. Masatlioglu and Raymond (2014) show that these preferences are the intersection of RDU and quadratic utility, and that they are quasiconvex if and only if λ ≥ 1. Corollary 2 links the consensus effect to a well-known notion of loss aversion. Intuitively, if the group is more likely to choose p than q when an individual is not pivotal, then it would naturally serve as a reference point when the individual is deciding how to make his choice (which will only matter in the case where he is pivotal). This almost exactly mirrors the underlying intuition many researchers have provided for a preference for conformity -it is a type of external (i.e. based on the actions of others) reference point.
3 Risky and Cautious Shifts, and the Allais Paradox In this section we focus on group choices between particular pairs of options, s(afe) and r(isky), where s is a degenerate lottery, that is, a lottery that yields a certain prize x ∈ X with probability 1, and r is some nondegenerate lottery. A group decision problem is then (r, s, α, β), where, as before, α ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that the individual is pivotal and β ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the group decides on the safe option, s, conditional on the individual not being pivotal. In this context, we refer to risky shift (resp., cautious shift) as the joint statement r ∼ s and r * s * (resp., r * ≺ s * ), where
These shifts are clearly a subset of the more general shifts discussed under the consensus effect. For a particular r, s, and α, there exists a β * where an individual always exhibits a risky shift for β ≤ β * and a safe shift for β ≥ β * if and only if the individual exhibits the consensus effect at (s, r, α, β * ).
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ERR used this setting and focused on RDU preferences. Below we review their contribution and use our results to understand whether, and how, their results generalize to other types of non-expected utility preferences. Segal (1987) showed that within RDU, a convex distortion function g in equ.
(1) implies (and is implied by) behavior that accommodates a version of Allais paradox -also known as the common consequence effect -which is one of the most prominent evidence against expected utility. Formally, fix any three prizes x 3 > x 2 > x 1 and denote by (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) the lottery that yields the prize x i with probability p i . 12 The following definition formalizes this notion of the Allais paradox. 
Theorem 1 in ERR states that within RDU, an individual exhibits Allais paradox if and only if for any r ∼ s and α ∈ (0, 1) there exists β * ∈ (0, 1) such that he exhibits risky (resp., cautious) shift if β < β * (resp., β > β * ). Thus, this is equivalent to the fact that within RDU an individual exhibits Allais paradox if and only if for all r, s, α there exists a β * such that they exhibit the consensus effect at (s, r, α, β * ).
ERR thus suggest an equivalence between a commonly known violation of expected utility and a robust phenomenon in the social psychology of groups when choosing between risky and safe options. Notice that because Allais-type behavior is equivalent to the convexity of the weighting function and therefore to quasi-convexity of preferences, it is also the case that within RDU we have additional equivalences, as the following corollary summarizes. 3. An individual's preferences satisfy quasi-convexity
An individual exhibits the consensus effect
Although these equivalences are quite strong (in the sense that they link specific behavior regarding r and s to arbitrary behavior for any p and q) and have an intuitive appeal (in that they link preferences for risk versus safe option in Allais questionnaire to similar preferences in group choice), we emphasize that these logical equivalences -as well as ERR original results -are derived in the narrow context of RDU preferences. We will now argue that they are specific to this class and do not hold in general. In other words, empirical evidence that refutes RDU also challenges the aforementioned relationship between an individual's private preferences and his preferences in a group context. To see this, we first show the equivalence described by ERR between risky and cautious shifts and the Allais paradox does not generalize outside of the class of rank-dependent preferences.
To demonstrate this, first observe that the pattern of risky and cautious shifts discussed in ERR is implied by the consensus effect. Thus, in constructing our examples, we will show that both quasi-convexity and quasi-concavity are consistent with both Allais-type behavior and with the opposite pattern of individual choice. We will consider quadratic preferences, already discussed in the previous section. We further use the following observation: Any lottery over fixed three outcomes l < m < h can be represented as a point (p, q) in a two-dimensional unit simplex, where the probability of l (p) is on the x-axis and that of h (q) is on the y-axis. Showing that indifference curves become steeper, or fanning out, in the 'north-east' direction is sufficient for Allais-type behavior, while the opposite pattern, fanning in, is sufficient for anti-Allais-type behavior.
Example 1: Our first example is of preferences which are quasi-concave but exhibit Allais-type behavior.Consider the utility functional,
which is quasi-concave (since log V is concave).
13 For three outcomes, l < m < h, define v and w as follows:
We show in the Appendix that the indifference curves of this utility functional are fanning out.
Example 2: Our second example is of preferences which are quasi-convex but exhibit anti-Allais-type behavior. Consider again three fixed outcomes, l < m < h, and Let
We show in the Appendix that the indifference curves of this utility functional are fanning in.
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These two examples show that Allais-type behavior and risky and safe shifts (and the consensus effect more generally) are not necessarily related outside RDU. We now demonstrate that even the equivalence between risky and safe shifts and quasiconvexity (and so the consensus effect) that Corollary 3 describes does not extend as 13 In this example, φ(x, y) = v(x)w(y)+v(y)w(x) 2 . 14 U is a quadratic functional, with φ(l, l) = −5, φ(m, l) = −3, φ(h, l) = 2.51, φ(m, m) = 0, φ(h, m) = 3.91, and φ(h, h) = 10.38.
well. While quasi-convexity is a sufficient condition for ERR's risk and safe shifts, it is not necessary, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3: Observe that while risky or cautious shifts imply that along each line connecting a degenerate lottery to any other lottery (in the multi-dimensional probability simplex) quasi-convexity must hold, it need not hold along lines which do not pass though a degenerate lottery. In particular, consider the 2-dimensional probability simplex, so that r has support with no more than 3 outcomes, one of which is s. Now consider two lotteries p and q which have support over the same three outcomes as r and s. Moreover, suppose that p ∼ q and neither are indifferent to r. Thus any convex combination of p and q must also have support over the same three outcomes. Similarly, any two lotteries p and q which in convex combination give p and q must also have support over the same three outcomes. Thus, there is no safe outcome which is an affine combination of p and q. It may be that the indifference curve passing through p and q is not quasi-convex (e.g. linear), yet all indifference curves that lie along convex combinations of all s and r are quasi-convex. Figure 1 provides a graphical example of such a situation in the Marschak-Machina triangle. Consider the region which contains all lines connecting the middle outcome to any point on indifference curve I (the set of points indifferent to the middle outcome). Within this region, indifference curves are strictly quasi-convex. Thus, we obtain ERR's risk and safe shifts. However, we do not have universal quasi-convexity (notably, in the region nearest the best outcome).
The underlying problem is that the pairs of r and s are not dense enough in the space of all lotteries. Essentially having the consensus effect at all pairs of r and s is equivalent to quasi-convexity holding along convex combinations of pairs of r and s. Relying on this intuition, the following pair of axioms -which are implied by but do not imply quasi convexity -are equivalent to ERR's risky and cautious shifts.
Axiom 1: Suppose s ∼ r and αs
Axiom 2: Suppose s ∼ r, then αs + (1 − α)r ≺ s for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Axiom 1 guarantees that along any convex combination of r and s utility is either single-peaked or single-valleyed. Axiom 2 guarantees that it is single-valleyed. The following proposition demonstrates that this is the correct weakening of quasiconvexity.
Proposition 3.
satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 if and only if, given any pair r and s with r ∼ s and any α ∈ (0, 1) , there exists β * ∈ [0, 1] such that the individual exhibits risky (resp., cautious) shift if β < β * (resp., β > β * ).
effects, preference reversals, and multiple equilibria. This is driven by the fact that quasi-convex preferences give the voting game properties of a coordination game.
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We describe a majority voting game as a collection of individuals, each of whom receives one vote to cast in favor of option p or option q (no abstentions are allowed).
16
Whichever option receives the majority of the votes is implemented. If the vote is tied, then the winner is decided by a coin flip. In line with recent literature on voting (e.g. Krishna and Morgan, 2012 and Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999), we will assume that the number of voters is a random variable which is distributed according to a Poisson distribution with mean N : the probability that there are exactly n voters is
Suppose we have three types of individuals. Those that prefer p to q (Type A), those that prefer q to p (Type B), and those that are indifferent (Type C). We will first focus on a simple majority voting rule. Each individual is drawn at random from each of the three types with probabilities f A , f B and f C , respectively, where
We denote the vector of probabilities by F . Each individual observes his own type and votes for either option p or option q.
As a benchmark, we first review the set of equilibria that emerge is all voters have expected utility preferences. Observe that in this equilibrium people vote for the option they favor in individual choice, or arbitrarily randomize between outcomes they are indifferent between.
We now turn to voters with quasi-convex preferences. Types A and B can now come in different sub-types. We call them A1, A2 (and B1, B2). Types A1 and B1 have monotone preferences between q and p. For example, A1 (resp., B1) strictly prefers λp + (1 − λ)q to βp + (1 − β)q if and only if λ > β (resp., λ < β).
18
In contrast, A2's preferences are non-monotonic between q and p. There exists a λ * such that λ * p+(1−λ * )q ∼ q. Thus, for all λ < λ * it is the case that λp+(1−λ)q ≺ q.
For B2, there exists a λ * such that λ * p + (1 − λ * )q ∼ p, and λp + (1 − λ)q ≺ p for all λ > λ * . We will refer to types A1 and B1 as monotone types, and the others as non-monotone types. We will assume that individuals within each type have the same preferences, so that given a group problem, λ * i is the same for all i of type A2 (similarly for B2 and C) and so have the same β * i for a given group problem.
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Before formally describing some of the properties of the equilibria, we informally discuss how the majority voting game changes with quasi-convex preferences. In particular, with quasi-convex preferences, the majority voting game takes on aspects of a coordination game -non-monotone types experience benefits from coordinating their votes with others because it reduces the amount of "randomness" in the election. 20 We turn now to studying some of the properties of the Nash equilibria of the voting game. First, we demonstrate that an equilibrium always exists. In particular, we prove the existence of an "anonymous Nash equilibria," that is, a Nash equilibrium in which each individual's strategy depends only on his preferences (i.e. his type) and not on the details of his identity. Although the exact set of equilibria will depend on the distribution F , we will highlight some of the salient features that differ from the expected utility case.
Proposition 5. An anonymous Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, in any equilibrium (not necessarily anonymous)
1. Generically, all individuals strictly prefer to vote for one option or the other.
Moreover, no individuals randomize 18 Expected utility preferences must be monotonic between q and p. 19 We focus on the situation where all individuals in each type have the same preferences for analytic convenience, although the results naturally extend to situations where they do not. 20 A key technical aside; as Crawford (1990) points out, games in which individuals have quasiconvex preferences may oftentimes admit no Nash equilibrium. He suggest a new notion "equilibrium in beliefs" which coincides with standard Nash equilibrium under expected utility, but also exists when players have quasi-convex preferences. We simply focus on the Nash equilibrium, which, as we show in Proposition 5, always exist because of the benefits of coordination.
Type A1s vote for p

Type B1s vote for q
In contrast to Proposition 4, here no individual randomizes and, in fact, strictly dislikes randomizing. Thus, we will expect to observe choice shifts in the groupindividuals who are indifferent between p and q in individual situations strictly prefer one or the other in a group setting.
21 Proposition 5, however, does not specify whether the shift would be towards q or towards p.
In order to provide intuition about the actual pattern of voting that can be observed in equilibrium, we will analyze the best response function of a voter. We index the number of possible voting combinations by m. Consider voting pattern V m . Suppose individual i is a member of type Γ. Given this, observe that F and V m generate a probability α(V m , F ) of an individual being pivotal, and so a threshold probability
Denote the set of types that vote for p given V m as P(V m ) and the set of types that vote for q given V m as Q(V m ) (where we suppose that all individuals of a single type choose the same option).
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The probability that p is chosen when i is not pivotal is:
, and q if the inequality is reversed. Thus, a voting pattern is an equilibrium if it is the case that V m generates β i,V m ,F that are consistent with it.
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The question of whether there is a unique equilibrium depends on the exact preferences and parameters of the problem. Because of the coordination nature of the 21 However, is not necessarily the case that if we sum up the total number of choices for p less the total number of choices for q in the individual choice problem, and compare it to the vote totals in the majority voting game, that the latter is farther from 1 2 than the former. See Section 5 for a discussion of this. 22 Here we define β i,V m ,F under the assumption that all individuals of the same type have the same behavior; a similar construction -albeit more complicated -can be performed without assuming anonymity.
23 Quasi-convexity of preferences alone provides no restrictions on the ordering of the thresholds β * (V m , Γ, F ) across the different non-monotone types. However, additional restrictions, such as that all preferences are in the quadratic class, do ensure that the thresholds are ordered in the "intuitive" fashion. majority voting game, there will often be multiplicity. However, the next proposition provides a sufficient condition for a unique pattern of voting. It states that whenever there are enough voters that strongly favor one of the options (i.e. in a monotone fashion), it is the case that all non-monotone types vote for that option as well. Proposition 6. Suppose N is sufficiently large and f A1 (resp., f B1 ) is sufficiently close to 1. Then the unique equilibrium is for all non-monotone types to choose p (resp., q).
Proposition 6 thus predicts group polarization to such an extent that it actually causes preference reversals -individuals who in an individual problem would choose q over p will now actually choose p in the group problem (e.g., type B2). The result generates an intuitive type of preference reversal -individuals coordinate on voting for an outcome strongly favored by many others.
However, individuals can also coordinate on equilibria that are not necessarily strongly favored, as shown by the next proposition. This proposition highlights how benefits from coordination generate multiple equilibria.
Proposition 7.
Suppose the proportion of non-monotone types is sufficiently close to 0. Then generically there is a unique equilibrium. 24 In contrast, for large enough N , if the proportion of non-monotone types is sufficiently close to 1, then there are always at least two equilibria.
In other words, when there are sufficient numbers of any non-monotone type, the benefits of coordination become so large that multiple equilibria must exist. This can have counter-intuitive effects on voting outcomes. For example, imagine that all individuals are of type A2 and hence, when choosing individually, will choose p. However, when choosing as a group they could not only coordinate on an equilibrium where everyone votes for p but also on one where everyone votes for q. The latter is clearly Pareto sub-optimal, but exists because of the benefits of coordination. Thus, we can observe preference reversal not just because an individual knows many other voters have "extreme" preferences, but also because an individual knows that many other voters have preferences where they would like to coordinate. Proposition 7 also demonstrates that when there are enough monotone types, we are guaranteed uniqueness of equilibrium. Importantly, the Proposition does not state that in this equilibrium non-monotone types will coordinate on their actions, but only that it will be unique. The intuition is that with very few non-monotone types, although individuals may not know with certainty which option will be chosen, they know with near certainty, regardless of the voting behavior of non-monotone types, what the probability that p is chosen, that is, they know β with near certainty, which implies uniqueness.
We can consider what happens as the voting rules shift. Denote one option, without loss of generality p, as the status quo, and consider what happens as the threshold T needed to replace p with q increases from 50 percent in favor of q. 25 Intuitively, as the threshold increases, the probability of q being chosen falls, and so non-monotone types become less likely to vote for q. Eventually, the unique equilibrium is for nonmonotone types to votes for p. Of course a similar result holds if q is made the "default" option.
Proposition 8.
For sufficiently large N and a T sufficiently close to 1, as long as f A1 is bounded away from 0, the unique equilibrium is for all non-monotone types to vote for p.
Because voters care about what happens when they are not pivotal, and the uncertainty about what will happen hinges on the number of voters, the size of the group has important implications for behavior. If there are too few voters, then any given individual can have a large impact on the election. In the extreme case, when there are one or two voters, an individual is always pivotal. In contrast, as n grows large the probability of being pivotal goes to 0, but also the chosen outcome when a voter is not pivotal becomes known with (almost) certainty. The following proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 9. For sufficiently small N types A2 and B2 always vote for p and q respectively. For a sufficiently large N , generically in all equilibria, all non-monotone types take the same action.
This proposition says that in large elections we should always expect to see preference reversals. Moreover, large elections will almost surely fail to aggregate preferences.
Discussion
Our discussion of quasi-convex preferences has focused on preferences that are explicitly non-expected utility. However, as pointed out by Machina (1984) , it is actually quite reasonable in many situations for an individual to exhibit quasi-convex preferences. Suppose an individual has expected utility preferences. If his payoffs depend not only on the chosen lottery (via the outcome that is realized from it), but also on an action that can be taken after the lottery is chosen, but before uncertainty is resolved (both the uncertainty about which lottery will be chosen, and the uncertainty about the outcome of the lottery), then the "induced" preferences observed over just the lottery choices will satisfy quasi-convexity. Suppose there are two individuals, facing two lotteries, p and q, between which they are both indifferent. There are three outcomes, and p is a binary lottery over the best and middle outcomes while q is a binary lottery over the best and worst outcomes. Both individuals are indifferent between p and q. The individuals vote as in our voting game. After voting, but before the chosen alternative is revealed, each individual can take one (and only one) of two "insurance" action; a 1 or a 2 . Action a 1 fully insures against the realization of the middle outcome, but not the low outcome, while a 2 insures against the realization of the low outcome, but not the middle outcome. Thus, even if the two individuals have expected utility preferences over lotteries, they have a strict incentive to coordinate their votes, because they would like to know which insurance action to take.
Because many applications focus on groups choosing between two options, we have also restricted our analysis to binary choices. Our results, however, are readily extended. For example, individuals will still exhibit a consensus effect. Imagine that the group must choose over Ω possible lotteries, denoted p 1 , ...p Ω , and that an individual is indifferent between all of them. Then, so long as p 1 (for example) is sufficiently likely to be chosen when he is not pivotal, the individual will vote for it pivotality.
One way of interpreting our results is in line with notions of reference dependence. Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) discuss how an individual may prefer p to q if expecting p, and q to p if expecting q. In line with this, our non-monotone individuals choose p if they think it is sufficiently likely that they will receive p regardless of their choice, and similarly for q. One way of interpreting this behavior is that individuals are disappointed when they receive outcomes in q and were expecting better outcomes in p, and vice versa. This complements the intuition given in Section 2.
Relation to Stylized Facts
The bandwagon effect, as described in the introduction, is discussed in Simon (1954), Fleitas (1971), Zech (1976), and Gartner (1976), among others. It captures the idea that if individuals believe others will vote for a certain option, they themselves are more likely to vote for that option as well. Thus, it reflects the best response function of an individual. Abusing notation slightly, we will denote the fraction of individuals voting for p given voting pattern V m as P(V m ) and for q as Q(V m ). Let
, and observe that Z ∈ (−1+f A1 , 1−f B1 ). The bandwagon effect describes the fact that if Z is large enough (close enough to 1) then any non-monotone type individual will strictly prefer to vote for p. Similarly, if Z is negative enough (close enough to -1) then any non-monotone type individual will strictly prefer to vote for q. For example, the results of Proposition 6 demonstrate the bandwagon effect: Z approaches 1 (resp., -1) as f A1 (resp., f B1 ) approaches 1. In Proposition 7, as f A1 + f A2 goes to 0, Z can take on any number in (−1, 1), thus the bandwagon effect guarantees two equilibria. The second part of Proposition 9 can also be interpreted in a similar manner -for a large enough N , Z is always sufficiently close to −1 or 1. Much of the discussion regarding group shift focuses on group polarization, where the group ends up having a more extreme decision than the aggregate of individuals' decisions in isolation. This has been documented in a variety of settings -for ex- 
Group polarization occurs if |f
it seems intuitive that the consensus effect generates group polarization, this is not necessarily true. While Proposition 6 guarantees that with large enough N the equilibrium exhibits group polarization, Propositions 7-9 do not necessarily guarantee this phenomenon, as whether or not polarization occurs depends on the shape of the preferences of the non-monotone types. In particular, fixing the distribution of types we can always find preferences for A2 and B2 types so that we get group de-polarization -that is
One explanation for group shifts is an explicit benefit of conformity or for being on the winning side (for example, Callander, 2007 , Hung and Plott, 2011 and Goeree and Yariv, 2015). Our model generates an endogenous cost of conformity; individuals are willing to vote against what they would choose in isolation in order to reduce the uncertainty of the outcome, or in other words to conform to what they expect to already happen. Their interest in doing so is not explicit, but rather depends on the distribution of types and expected number of voters.
The fact that individuals care about the voting patterns of others means that their willingness to vote (measured in terms of utils) can have different patterns compared to a situation where preferences are expected utility. For example, we can measure the amount an individual is willing to pay to have his vote cast for his lesser favored option, say p, compared to his more favored one, q, by U (p * ) − U (q * ). The corresponding measure in an individual setting is U (p) − U (q). With expected utility preferences both (i) U (p * ) − U (q * ) > 0 if and only if U (p) − U (q) > 0; and (ii)
is falling in the individual's probability of being pivotal.
Neither of these facts are necessarily true in our model. It should be clear from our results that we may have U (p) − U (q) > 0 while U (p * ) − U (q * ) < 0. In this case, we immediately know that U (p * ) − U (q * ) is non-monotone in the probability of being pivotal. This is because as the probability of being pivotal goes to 0 (as N goes to infinity) it must be the case that U (p * ) − U (q * ) converges to 0. 26 It can also be the case that although N > 1,
; although as N goes to infinity U (p * ) − U (q * ) converges to 0, it may actually (locally) increase in N in a certain region.
27 26 The non-monotonicity pattern does not rely on observing a preference reversal, that is, on U (p) − U (q) and U (p * ) − U (q * ) having opposite signs. 27 A similar construction can be shown to be true for the willingness to pay to vote: even though N has increased, an individual's willingness to pay to actually vote may increase
Related Literature
Political scientists and economists have long recognized that with either voluntarycostless or compulsory voting, an equilibrium exists where all individuals always vote for Option 1 (or all vote for Option 2). These equilibria, which involve coordination with expected utility preferences, are knife-edge cases, in the sense that some individuals are exactly indifferent between voting for either of the two options. Thus, the equilibrium is not robust to small costs or to uncertainty about the number of voters (as in the Poisson model). In contrast, voters in our model may strictly prefer exhibit preference reversals in group situations, and so our results are robust to small perturbations, in line with the fact that we obtain our results while explicitly incorporating uncertainty about the number of voters. And as our results show, although we do not observe such coordination equilibrium in the game with expected utility preferences, we do with quasi-convex preferences.
Our results are related to the large literature on understanding voting and the aggregation of preferences or information in elections. 28 The literature has made two assumptions regarding how individuals value outcomes. The first, as we made in this paper, is the assumption of private values. In this case, with expected utility preferences and either compulsory or costless voting, all voters vote sincerely (i.e., individuals vote as part of the group in the same way they would choose in isolation) and all individuals vote. Thus preferences are aggregated, in the sense that not only is the correct outcome chosen, but the true proportion of supporters of each side is also revealed (although not the strength of preference), modulo indifference. These results stand in contrast to what we obtain, where we find equilibria (sometimes unique) in which individuals do not vote sincerely and, moreover, we can generate pareto-dominated equilibria where preferences are not aggregated properly. Thus, with violations of expected utility, even in situations most amenable to sincere voting and preference-aggregation, we find failure of these two properties. If voting is costly (but still under the private values assumption), then as Ledyard 28 An important distinction is that while we assume that alternatives in the voting game are lotteries, most papers suppose they are final outcomes. Of course, this complicates thinking about our results in relation to the pre-existing literature; for example, in a common-values setting, private signals would then need to be about a particular outcome in the support of p or q. We nevertheless believe our assumption is natural in many instances; for example, if voters value candidates by what policies they will implement and there is a degree of uncertainty about what campaign promises candidates will actually follow through with. Although, as expected, voters who do vote (and not all will) will vote sincerely, it is not the case that preferences will be properly aggregated. 29 Taylor and Yildrim (2010) show that in large elections where the lower bounds of the costs are strictly positive, the winning outcome is determined in large part by the cost distributions. Specifically, as the size of the electorate grows, they find that only individuals with the lowest possible costs vote. Moreover, each outcome is equally likely to win the election if and only if the lower bounds of the cost distribution of each set of supporters is equal. Otherwise, the outcome whose supporters have a lower cost distribution is more likely. Non-expected utility preferences will act only to further reduce the informativeness of elections, as voters may no longer even vote sincerely. The other assumption in the literature is that outcomes have a common value component across voters. Individual voters receive signals about that common value component. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) noted that individuals in common-value settings where voting is compulsory may vote in an insincere way, for strategic reasons, and so choices made in isolation can differ from that made as part of a group. Building on this insight, and again with compulsory voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that sincere voting is in fact not an equilibrium, yet information is still aggregated correctly in large elections. Krishna and Morgan (2012) demonstrate that if participation is voluntary (either free or costly) all equilibira involve sincere voting, as well as positive participation, and information is aggregated in large elections (although, as Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996 , show, some voters strictly prefer to abstain even when voting is costless). 30 Changing the assumption of expected utility to quasi-convexity will substantially alter the findings of this vein of the literature. Voters may vote insincerely not only for strategic reasons but also for reasons related 29 In standard voting models the motivation to abstain is either because of an explicit cost of voting or because of a concern of voting for the wrong candidate. The motivation for voting is to ensure that in situations where the vote would have been pivotal, the right candidate is chosen. With quasi-convex preferences, there is an additional motivation: when pivotal, the voter wants to ensure that their vote also reduces the randomness of the outcome. to their desire to reduce the randomness of the election. These motivations for insincere voting will impede information aggregation. It can still be the case that voters may prefer to abstain even when voting is costless, although because voters have a desire to reduce randomness in outcomes, they have an added incentive to participate.
A simple example can highlight this issue. Suppose there are five voters in a majority rule election. Voters 1 and 2 are partisans and will always vote for option p (as specified below). Voters 3, 4, and 5 care about both what state will be realized and what alternative was chosen; in particular, they want to match the chosen alternative to the state. There are two equally likely states, s p and s q . Suppose there are three final outcomesx > x > x. The alternatives are two lotteries p and q. p (resp., q) gives x with probability ρ regardless of the state, andx with probability 1 − ρ if the state is s p (resp., s q ), and x with probability 1 − ρ if the state is s q (resp., s p ). Finally, voters 3 and 4 receive perfectly revealing private signals about the state prior to voting, while voter 5 receives no signal at all.
If all voters have expected utility preferences, then consider a situation where Voters 3 and 4 always vote in accordance with their perfectly revealing signals. Voter 5 now wants to condition her vote on being pivotal. Voter 5 knows that the only time she is pivotal is when the state is s q (otherwise all other four voters are voting for p). Thus, she should always cast her vote for q. It is easy to show that such behavior on the parts of voters 3, 4, and 5 constitute an equilibrium which aggregates information. Now, to make the minimal deviation from the standard model, suppose only voter 5 has quasi-convex preferences (everyone else still has expected utility preferences), that are non-monotone preferences between p and q. Since states are equally likely, p * = p and q * = q. One can easily construct preferences such that p * is preferred to q * . In this case there will be no equilibrium that aggregates information.
Appendix: Proofs
Before we discuss the proofs, whenever we consider two arbitrary options p and q, we adopt the following normalization: Recall that for all values of α, β ∈ [0, 1], q * and p * are on the line segment connecting q and p in some multidimensional simplex.
In order to simplify notation, we will rotate the probability simplex so that for any given p and q under consideration, this line segment runs from the origin through e 1 = (1, 0, 0, 0...) and associate q with the origin. Moreover, we can now focus on the 1 dimensional case, and think of the line segment connecting 0 and 1 where we associate q with 0 and p with 1. We will thus associate a lottery zp + (1 − z)q for z ∈ [0, 1] with the point z. Note that since p * − q * = α(p − q) = α, we have that
Moreover, we fix representation of the preference relation for each given type V Γ , which can depend on the type Γ (we will frequently omit the dependence on Γ to simplify notation). For z , z ∈ [0, 1], let γ(z , z ) = V (z ) − V (z ) measure the utility gap between z and z . Observe that γ depends on the exact representation V . However, we will be concerned with ordinal rather than cardinal properties of γ and V .
Lemma 1
satisfies strict quasi-convexity if and only if for all p and q such that p ∼ q there exists a z * ∈ (0, 1) such that V is strictly decreasing on [0, z * ] and strictly increasing on [z * , 1].
Proof of Lemma 1: First we show the if part. Observe that the assumption implies that V (z) < V (p) = V (q) for all z ∈ (0, 1). This implies quasi-convexity since it holds for arbitrary p and q such that p ∼ q. We now show the only if part. Suppose not. Then for some pair p and q such that p ∼ q there is no z * with the properties as in the premise. This implies that there exists at least one interior local maximum, denoted Z ∈ (0, 1). Then, by continuity,
Lemma 2 For all p and q such that p ∼ q there exists a z * ∈ (0, 1) such that V is strictly decreasing on [0, z * ] and strictly increasing on [z * , 1], if and only if for all p and q such that p ∼ q and α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a pair z , z ∈ [0, 1] with the following three properties:
2. For all z > z , z > z , and z > z , γ( z , z ) > 0.
3. For all z < z , z < z , and z < z , γ( z , z ) < 0. 
Proof of Lemma
The proof that 3 is implied is exactly analogous.
To prove the if part, suppose it is not the case so that there is an interior local maxima in the interval, denoted Z ∈ (0, 1). Then, by continuity, there exists a neighborhood [z,z] Z such that V (z) = V (z). Thus there exists an α such that z −z = α . Observe that the pair z,z satisfies condition 1, but not conditions 2 or 3.
Proof of Proposition 1: By construction p * − q * = α. Given that, Condition 1 implies that at β * we have p * = z and q * = z . By Conditions 2 and 3 of Lemma 2, β > β * (resp., β < β * ) implies that γ(p * , q * ) > 0 (resp.,< 0). Conversely, the pair p * , q * at β * satisfies the properties of z , z ∈ [0, 1] in Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 1: Wakker (1994) shows that convexity of g is equivalent to quasi-convexity of preferences. The result follows from Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Recall that quadratic preferences imply mixture symmetry (Chew, Epstein and Segal, 1991). The preference relation satisfies mixture symmetry if for all p, q ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [0, 1],
Suppose q ∼ p. By mixture symmetry, we have
∈ (0, 1) and we have p * = kq
Moreover, by mixture symmetry we have
∈ (0, 1) and we have q * = lp * + (1 − l) p. By strict quasi-convexity p * q * .
And if β = 0.5 and q ∼ p then, by mixture symmetry,
To show the other direction, suppose preferences do not satisfy strict quasiconvexity everywhere. If preferences satisfy betweenness someplace, then in that region the decision-maker is indifferent to convexification. If preferences satisfy strict quasi-concavity somewhere, then we observe an anti-consensus effect in that region. To see this, denote the probability of h by q and the probability of l by p. The utility of a lottery (h, q; m,
First, we will normalize the utility values. Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991) show that φ is unique up to affine transformation. So we will set φ(m, m) = 0 and φ(m, l) = φ(l, m) = −1 (recall that φ(m, m) ≥ φ(l, m) by monotonicity). The other relevant values of φ will be stated below.
Second, recall that Allais-type behavior is equivalent to indifferent curves fanning out in the probability simplex, where the value of p is on the horizontal axis and that of q on the vertical axis. Fanning out is equivalent to the slopes of the indifference curves becoming less steep moving horizontally in the simplex. The slope of the indifference curves is equal to
Taking the derivative ∂µ(p,q) ∂p and observing that its denominator is always positive, we know that to determine its sign (which tells us whether we get fanning out or fanning in) we only need to consider its numerator.
First, we focus on fanning out along the p − axis, and so will set q = 0 after calculating
. Note that the derivative of the numerator of µ (p, q) with respect to p is 2[2 + φ(l, l)], while the derivative of the denominator of µ (p, q) with respect to p is [−2φ(h, m) + 2φ(h, l) + 2]. We also have that at q = 0, the numerator of µ (p, q) equals 2p In order to extend fanning out throughout the unit simplex, we use the notion of expansion paths, defined by Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991) . We will use their definition, tailored to our example, which is as follows.
Given three outcomes l < m < h, consider the probability simplex (i.e. triangle) over those three outcomes, as described in the text (where q denotes the probability of h and p the probability of l). Suppose that indifference curves in this space are always differentiable inside the simplex, where, as above, µ (p, q) denotes the slope of the indifference curve passing through any given point (p, q). An expansion path collects the set of all points, the indifference curve through which have the same slope (that is, (p, q) and (p , q ) are on the same expansion path if µ (p, q) = µ (p , q ).) Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991) show that for quadratic preferences which are not expected utility, expansion paths are linear (in the case of expected utility all points in the simplex are in the same expansion path). Moreover, they show that either 
or
• all expansion paths intersect at a single point (i.e., if two expansion paths intersect at (p , q ) then all expansion paths must intersect there), which may or may not be inside the unit simplex (i.e., it is possible that the point where they intersect has p and q values greater than 1 or less than 0)
We now turn to applying expansion paths to our example. In Example 1, the "reduced form" utility function over lotteries defined over the three outcomes (taking into account our normalized values) is:
Observe that > 0, and so we know the indifference curves take the shape of hyperbolas, and thus all expansion paths intersect at a single point. 32 To find this point of intersection, we simply need to find the critical point of the utility function. 33 The first order conditions demonstrate that this is at p = 4, q = 1. Thus, all expansion paths must intersect there, which in turns implies that, within the unit simplex, all expansion paths are positively sloped (and do not intersect within the simplex). Consider moving from some point (p, q) to (p , q) in the probability simplex, with p < p . Denote the expansion path (p, q) is on as E 1 and the expansion path (p , q) is on as E 2 . Then we can find points (p, 0) and (p , 0) such that the former is on expansion path E 1 and the latter is on expansion path E 2 . Since the expansion paths cannot cross anywhere other than (4, 1),p <p . But we know from our previous reasoning that, regardless of the initial value of p, when increasing p and moving along the line q = 0, the slopes of the indifference curves decrease. So the slope of the indifference curve is lower at (p , 0) than (p, 0), meaning that the slope of the indifference curve must be lower at (p , q) than (p, q). Therefore, we get fanning out as p increases, regardless of q, so long as we are inside the probability simplex.
Proof of Example 2:
We consider the functional over (p, q) given by U = −6p + p 2 + 7.82q − 3.2pq + 2.56q
For details, see Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) . Intuitively, the expansion paths all must intersect at center of the hyperbolas, or, in other words, at the point of intersection of the asymptotes. 33 This follows from the fact that the asymptotes of the hyperbola must be on the same level set. In order to extend fanning in throughout the probability simplex, we use expansion paths in a similar way to Example 1. Since the indifference curves are parabolas, it is the case that the expansion paths are parallel. 34 Moreover, because the axis of symmetry of the indifference curves is an expansion path, the expansion paths have positive slopes. Consider moving from some point (p, q) to (p , q), where p < p . Denote the expansion path (p, q) is on as E 1 and the expansion path (p , q) is on as E 2 . Then we can find points (p, 0) and (p , 0) such that the former is on expansion path E 1 and the latter is on expansion path E 2 . Since the expansion paths cannot crossp <p . But we know from our previous reasoning that, regardless of the starting value of p, when increasing p and moving along the line q = 0 the slope of the indifference curves increase. So the slope of the indifference curves is higher at (p , 0) than at (p, 0), which, in turns, implies that the slope of the indifference curves must be higher at (p , q) than (p, q). So we get fanning in as p increases, regardless of q.
Proof of Proposition 3:
First, we will let s = p and r = q and use our normalization described at the beginning of the Appendix. We will show that Axioms 1 and 2 hold if and only if for all s and r such that s ∼ r, there exists a z * ∈ (0, 1) such that V is strictly decreasing on [0, z * ] and strictly increasing on [z * , 1].
Suppose that for all s and r such that s ∼ r there exists a z * ∈ (0, 1) such that Given this equivalence we have shown, we now simply use a modified Lemma 2 with s = p and r = q, which proves the result on (r, s) pairs.
Proof of Proposition 4: For any distribution F over types, consider the strategies as specified in the Proposition. Type C voters are indifferent between all possible outcomes and hence will be indifferent between any randomization over p and q. Since the number of voters is a random variable, there is always a non-zero probability any given individual is pivotal. Thus type A voters will always strictly prefer to vote for p and type B voters will always strictly prefer to vote for q. it is clear that in any equilibrium, A1 and B1 types will behave like expected utility maximizers, which implies points 2 and 3.
To show the existence of an anonymous equilibrium, notice that actions can't depend on an individual's identity, just their type. Thus
We prove existence by contradiction, that is we will suppose no such equilibrium exists and show a contradiction occurs. We do this in several steps.
• Initially we suppose all NM types vote for p. Call this voting pattern (1 : 1).
35
We will order the three NM types by increasing order of the threshold required 35 In the proof we induct on the number of types (the number on the left), and within each type, on the number of individuals within it (the number on the right).
to vote for q (given this voting pattern): I, II and III. Thus, if type III wants to switch their vote to q then all other NM types would as well. Since, by assumption, we are supposing this is not an equilibrium, then at least one of the three NM types wants to deviate to voting for q. Clearly individuals of type I must want to switch (because of our ordering assumption).
We now order all possible individuals 1, 2, .... Observe that only a subset of these individuals will be realized in the Poisson distribution. We will consider each individual's strategy, conditional on him being of type I and induct on the order of the individuals. Begin with individual 1. By construction, in the proposed voting pattern, β * (V We continue by simply inducting on the number of individuals. After all individuals with index smaller than k have switched, we have voting pattern (1 : k). It is clear using the reasoning described above that all individuals in type I with index greater than k strictly prefer q * (V (1:k) , I, F ) to p * (V (1:k) , I, F ) and the same for those with index less than k, which guarantees that they will not switch back to vote for p. Thus, we conclude this step by having a potential anonymous equilibrium where of the NM types, types I vote for q and the other NM types vote for p.
• Suppose again, continuing our contradiction, that this voting pattern (where of the NM types, types I vote for q and the other NM types vote for p) isn't an equilibrium. Denote this voting pattern by (2 : 1). Now, we re-order the two remaining NM types that are voting for p under voting pattern (2 : 1), calling them types II and III. 36 Under our assumption that voting pattern (2 : 1) is 36 Types II and III need not correspond to the same groups as under voting pattern (1 : 1); the not an equilibrium, it must be the case that II types want to switch from voting for p to q.
We now repeat the inductive process from the previous step but for individuals in type II; order all individuals, and conditional on them drawing that type, switching them one by one from voting for p to voting for q. Observe that after individual k in type II switches from voting for p to q, that for all other individuals both p * (V (2:k+1) , Γ, F ) and q * (V (2:k+1) , Γ, F ) are both closer to q than p * (V (2:k) , Γ, F ) and q * (V (2:k) , Γ, F ) respectively. This means that (i) conditional on drawing type II no individual has an incentive to switch their votes, and (ii) conditional on drawing type I no individual would want to switch their vote back to p after any step in the inductive process. We conclude this step by having a potential equilibrium where of the NM types, types I and II vote for q and the type III vote for p.
• Lastly, we repeat the same exercise above, applying to type III voters. We will then conclude that we have an equilibrium in which all NM types vote for q, and have a strict preference to do so. This equilibrium is obviously anonymous, contradicting the assumption that no such equilibrium exists.
We now turn to proving the properties of the equilibrium. We have already proved parts 2 and 3. Suppose that an equilibrium exists with voting pattern V Before proceeding we prove another useful Lemma.
Lemma 3 For all > 0 there exists an N * , such that N ≥ N * implies α = p * −q * ≤ .
Proof of Lemma 3:
As N goes to infinity the probability of being pivotal goes to 0. Thus α goes to 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: Letz * indicate the highest value of z * Γ across all NM types, which meansz * ∈ (0, 1). 37 For a large enough f A1 and large enough N , in any ranking of the threshold to switch from p to q may be lower in one group under (1 : 1) but higher under (2, 1). Proof of Proposition 7: Proof of the first part: Each voting pattern generates a β i,V m ,F . Observe that since types A1 and B1 always vote for p and q respectively, as the proportion of NM types goes to 0 it is the case that β i,V m ,F goes to some constant β regardless of the voting pattern of the NM types. Similarly, β * (V m , Γ, F ) goes to β * (Γ). Generically, in the space of preferences, these two are not equal and thus each NM type will have a unique best response regardless of the strategy of any other NM type.
Proof of the second part: Observe that if β i,V m ,F is arbitrarily close to 1 then all individuals will vote p. Similarly if it is arbitrarily close to 0, all individuals will vote q. If the proportion of NM types goes to 1 and all NM types vote for p, then β i,V m ,F goes to 1 and so we have an equilibrium. Similar logic applies if all NM types vote for q.
Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose f A1 > > 0. Recall we need for a proportion of at least T people to vote for q in order for it to be chosen. But even if all NM types vote for q, as T goes to 1 the probability that the proportion of votes for q is greater than T goes to 0. Thus p * (V m , Γ, F ) and q * (V m , Γ, F ) both go to p, so p * is preferred over q * by all NM types. Thus in equilibrium all NM must vote for p.
Proof of Proposition 9: For the first part: Clearly when N is small enough, conditional on being realized as an actual voter, an individual puts arbitrarily high probability on being the only person, and so their vote is pivotal. Thus A2 and B2 will almost surely determine the outcome and so always vote for p and q respectively. We prove the second part of Proposition 9 in two steps. First, we show that it holds for all anonymous equilibria. Recall that in all anonymous equilibria, all individuals of the same type take the same action. For large enough N , the proportion of each type in the total number of voters is known with near certainty (equals f Γ ). Moreover, fixing an equilibrium it is known exactly what action each type takes. This means that with near certainty we know what proportion of the total number of voters choose p and what proportion choose q, and hence the outcome of the voting game is known with near certainty; in other words, for all individuals β i,V m ,F is arbitrarily close to either 1 or to 0. Without loss of generality suppose β i,V m ,F is arbitrarily close to 1. Then p * (V m , Γ, F ) is arbitrarily close to p and since N is large, Lemma 3 implies that q * (V m , Γ, F ) is also arbitrarily close to p * (V m , Γ, F ) (and so to p). This immediately implies that for any Γ, q * (V m , Γ, F ) and p * (V m , Γ, F ) are both greater than z * Γ , and so all NM types prefer to choose p. This proves the second part in the case of anonymous equilibria.
The next step is to prove that with large N , generically all equilibria are anonymous. Consider two different individuals, i and j, who are considering their strategies, conditional on drawing the same type Γ. We can iterate this argument over all individuals of a given type, and we obtain an anonymous equilibrium. Thus, the only situation where we may have non-anonymous equilibria is where we have an (infinite) sequence of N along which p *
